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Abstract. A theme of recent side-channel research has been the quest for distinguishers which remain
eﬀective even when few assumptions can be made about the underlying distribution of the measured leakage
traces. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is a well known non-parametric method for distinguishing
between distributions, and, as such, a perfect candidate and an interesting competitor to the (already
much discussed) mutual information (MI) based attacks. However, the side-channel distinguisher based
on the KS test statistic has received only cursory evaluation so far, which is the gap we narrow here.
This contribution explores the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of Kolmogorov-Smirnov analysis (KSA), and
compares it with mutual information analysis (MIA) in a number of relevant scenarios ranging from
optimistic ﬁrst-order DPA to multivariate settings. We show that KSA shares certain `generic' capabilities
in common with MIA whilst being more robust to noise than MIA in univariate settings. This has the
practical implication that designers should consider results of KSA to determine the resilience of their
designs against univariate power analysis attacks.
1 Introduction
Diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) is a form of side-channel analysis which employs some type of statistic
(the distinguisher) to identify a correct hypothesis about (part of) the secret key from within a set of possible
alternative hypotheses. Popular distinguishers include the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient, the distance-of-means
test, and mutual information analysis (MIA). Mutual information (MI) measures the total dependency between
two random variables, and was ﬁrst proposed for use as a distinguisher at CHES 2008 ([5]). MIA's selling point
is genericity : it is capable of key recovery even when the underlying leakages satisfy few assumptions.
Previous work such as [17] and [14] demonstrated that the (notoriously problematic) estimation of the leakage
probability density functions for diﬀerent key-dependent models is of decisive importance to the performance
of MIA in practice. The authors of [17] suggested two alternative distinguishers based on statistics which are
conceptually similar to MI but do not require explicit density estimation: the (two-sample) Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test and the Cramér-von-Mises criterion. Each essentially computes some notion of a `distance' between
two distributions. Evaluations of these (and other similar) methods can be found in the statistical literature
(for example, [16]): whilst the Cramér-von-Mises statistic performs particularly well (i.e. better than KS) for
certain speciﬁc distributions, the KS statistic is found to perform well across the board and therefore represents
the most generic, distribution-free method.
In this submission we demonstrate how the KS test statistic adapts to the purposes of DPA and investigate the
properties and practical performance of such attacks. Alongside, we present an equivalent analysis of MIAan
ideal comparator because of its established role in the existing literature as well as its conceptual similarity to
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Analysis (KSA). We assess the distinguishers as applied to key-recovery attacks against
implementations of DES in four practically relevant leakage scenarios. Our results are interesting for academics
and practitioners alike: from an academic point of view it is interesting to investigate how a conceptually similar
approach such as the KS test performs in comparison to MIA. From a practical point of view we are providing
information about how to choose the most appropriate distinguisher in certain settings. Speciﬁcally, in the
setting where the actual power model of a device is unknown to the attacker and does not correspond to a
`nice' Hamming weight leakage, and where a substantial amount of noise distorts the data-dependent signal,
we show that KSA actually outperforms MIA and hence is the best choice of a distinguisher (in this setting) at
present. This setting is practically relevant as it resembles what can be expected when attacking devices that
implement cryptography in hardware and have measures in place to increase the level of noise.
This submission starts by introducing diﬀerential power analysis (DPA) attacks in Sect. 2. To explain our com-
parison criterion we outline some key concepts related to the outcomes of DPA attacks (i.e. the distinguishing
vectors) in Sect. 3. We then explain how the KS test adapts to DPA attacks (including considerations for
higher-order attacks) in Sect. 4. Section 5 consists of our results. We conclude thereafter in Sect. 6.
1.1 Our Contributions
In Sect. 3 we adapt the ideas presented in [18] to our purposes and introduce the measure of nearest-rival
distinguishability to compare distinguishers. We argue that this measure is relevant for practical considerations
as it strongly inﬂuences the number of traces required for successful key recovery: the smaller the nearest-rival
distinguishability score, the more traces will be necessary before the correct key stands out from the alternative
hypotheses when the vector comes to be estimated in practice.
In Sect. 4 we show how the KS test statistic can be used to construct a distinguisher for power analysis attacks.
We brieﬂy include relevant results of the statistical literature and show how to apply them in the context
of univariate and multivariate attacks. An interesting conclusion that we can draw is that whilst KSA shares
many properties with MIA in the univariate setting, its extension to general multivariate settings is problematic
(([12], ([4])).
In Sect. 5 we analyse the application of the KS distinguisher to four relevant scenarios. An important phe-
nomenon that we observe is that KSA is consistently more robust to noise. Our results give conclusive evidence
that it outperforms MIA in univariate scenarios (our study ranges from the optimistic Hamming weight as-
sumption to realistic leakages including the assumption of an unknown highly-nonlinear function). Interesting
observations result from our study of bivariate extensions of KSA: here it clearly underperforms MIA both in
the masked and unmasked case, irrespective of noise. Our contribution thus gives a balanced view of KSA; it
shows both its strengths and weaknesses.
2 Diﬀerential Power Analysis
In this article we consider a `standard DPA attack' scenario as deﬁned in [9]. We assume that the power
consumption T of the target cryptographic device depends on some internal value (or state) fk∗(x). The state
is a function of some part of the plaintext x ∈ X , as well as some part of the secret key k∗ ∈ K. Consequently,
we have that T = L ◦ fk∗(X) + ε, where X is a random variable taking values in X , L is some function which
describes the data-dependent component and ε comprises the remaining power consumption which can be
modeled as independent random noise. The attacker has N power measurements corresponding to encryptions
of N known plaintexts xi ∈ X , i = 1, . . . , N and wishes to recover the secret key k∗. The attacker can accurately
compute the internal values as they would be under each key hypothesis {fk(xi)}Ni=1, k ∈ K and uses whatever
information he possesses about the true leakage function L to construct a prediction model M : f(X ) −→M.
DPA is based on the intuition that the modeled power traces corresponding to the correct key hypothesis
should bear more resemblance to the true power traces than the modeled traces corresponding to incorrect
key hypotheses. An attacker is thus concerned with comparing the degree of similarity between the true and
modeled traces. A range of comparison tools`distinguishers'can be used, of which mutual information (MI)
is an example. MI measures, in bits, the total information shared between two random variables, and is most
intuitively expressed in terms of entropies via Shannon's formula: I(A;B) = H(A)−H(A|B).
It is employed as an attack distinguisher to compare the measured traces T with the hypothesis-dependent
predictions Mk =M ◦ fk(X):
DMI(k) = I(T ;Mk) = H(T )−H(T |Mk) = H(T )− E
m∈M
[H(T |Mk = m)] , (1)
and because the `unexplained' entropy (the second term) is smallest when the predictions are good, we expect
(1) to be maximised for the correct key hypothesis k = k∗.
MI is particularly appealing for use in DPA because it compares distributions in a general way, detecting not just
linear relationships but nonlinear relationships too. Thus MIA has been promoted as a `generic' distinguisher
which potentially remains eﬀective even in the absence of a good power model. It also has natural multivariate
extensions, by which it can be straightforwardly adapted to higher-order attacks (see [2] for an overview).
However, estimation of MI is notoriously problematic ([11]); all known estimators are biased and no `ideal'
estimator exists (diﬀerent estimators perform diﬀerently depending on the underlying structure of the data).
Consequently, MIA outcomes are highly sensitive to the estimation procedure and parameters chosen by the
attacker.
3 Evaluation Methodology
The aim of our paper is to compare KSA with MIA in practically relevant scenarios. It is imperative to under-
stand that we are seeking to compare statistical procedures and not attacks or devices: our methodology hence
operates on hypothetical leakages simulated on the basis of clearly deﬁned, practically relevant characteristics
such as cryptographic function (we use as examples a non-linear substitution box taken from the DES standard,
as well as the Boolean exclusive-or), device leakage model (we use as examples Hamming weight, the sum of
unevenly weighted bits, and a highly-nonlinear function), and noise (we use Gaussian noise). Our results will
be relevant for all devices which share above mentioned characteristics.
Our approach is based on the recent work published in [18] which proposes to study `complicated' distinguishers
such as MIA by computing and estimating (respectively) so-called theoretic and practical distinguishing vectors.
The motivation for this is that distinguishers like MIA do not conform to the easily understood behaviours
of `simple' distinguishers such as correlation, which has a known sampling distribution and responds to noise
in a well-understood fashion ((e.g. see Chapters 4 and 6 in [8]). We have mentioned before that estimation is
notoriously diﬃcult [11]. Studying only practical distinguishing vectors does not in many cases (as illustrated
by previous work such as [2]) allow us to draw any deﬁnite conclusions about MIA because it is unclear from
the practical vectors whether it is a lack of good estimators or an inherent weakness of MIA that causes its
sometimes disappointing performance in practice. By contrast, by studying both theoretic and practical vectors
we can assess whether MI itself is the problem or simply the estimation process.
Another contribution of [18] is that of deﬁning measures for distinguishability. This is motivated by the fact
that the larger the theoretic (true) margins by which the correct key is distinguished, the fewer traces we expect
to require to detect this diﬀerence in practice ([7]). We use the following subsections to further elaborate on
the key concepts relevant to our study (theoretic and practical distinguishing vectors, distinguishability).
3.1 Theoretic vs. Practical Distinguishing Vectors
We adopt the notation of [18], which deﬁnes the theoretic attack distinguisher as D = {D(k)}k∈K = {D(L ◦
fk∗(X)+ε,M◦fk(X))}k∈K, where the plaintext inputX takes values in X according to some known distribution
(usually uniform). The distinguisher D is chosen as some function, e.g. MI. For a deﬁned leakage function L
and a power model M , the value D(k) can be precisely calculated. It thus represents the `true' value of the
distinguisher given M , L, and key hypothesis k.
How to compute the `true' distinguisher values. For each possible input x ∈ X to the cryptographic function we
obtain a vector evaluating the (variance Var(ε)) Gaussian density centred at the corresponding data-dependent
leakage value L ◦ fk∗(x). The average of these vectors, weighted by the input probabilities P(X = x), then
gives the probability density of the power consumption evaluated over the full range of possible leakage values.
Conditional densities, corresponding to each possible prediction value m ∈M under each key hypothesis k ∈ K,
are constructed similarly. From these probability densities we are able to directly compute (via numerical
integration) MIA distinguishing vectors as per equation (1). The same approach allows us to compute KSA
distinguishing vectors (to be deﬁned in Sect. 4, equation (2)).
In practice D must be estimated as the true distribution of T is unknown (in the unproﬁled setting which we
are examining). Suppose we have observations corresponding to the vector of inputs x = {xi}Ni=1, and write
e = {ei}Ni=1 to be the observed noise (i.e. drawn from the distribution of ε). Then the estimated vector is
DˆN = {DˆN (k)}k∈K = {DˆN (L ◦ fk∗(x) + e,M ◦ fk(x))}k∈K.
The theoretic distinguishing vector D can thus be seen as representing the `best' result one could hope to
achieve when performing an analysis in practice.
3.2 Notion of Distinguishability
It follows clearly from the working principle of the distinguishers (as explained in previous sections) that the
results of each will be on very diﬀerent scales: MI is measured in bits and takes values between zero and the total
entropy of the measured traces, whereas the KS statistic measures the (absolute) diﬀerence between probability
distributions and therefore takes values in [0, 1]. In order to make meaningful comparisons we need to deﬁne
an outcome measure which is independent of the numerical results of distinguishers. One approach is to look
at how well the correct key hypothesis `stands out'. Previous work has introduced measures for `standing out',
e.g. a DPA signal-to-noise ratio was deﬁned in [6]. We seek to represent, more directly than the DPA signal-
to-noise ratio, the margin to be detected by a practical attack. Thus we look at the distance of the correct key
hypothesis from its nearest rival, and to scale this by an appropriate normalising constant. Consequently, we
deﬁne the nearest-rival distinguishability score as the diﬀerence between the true-key distinguisher value and
the highest incorrect-key value, divided by the standard deviation of the `optimal' distinguishing vector: the
theoretic output of an attack in a noise-free setting with a known power model.
Nearest-rival distinguishability(D) =
D(k∗)−max{D(k)|k 6= k∗}√
Var{D(L ◦ fk∗(X), L ◦ fk(X))}k∈K
.
We stress again that this measure of theoretic distinguishability is a meaningful indicator of the practical
eﬃciency of an attack as statistical theory (for example, [7]) teaches us that the sample size required to detect
a diﬀerence is strongly related to the true size of that diﬀerence: the lower the score, the more traces we expect
to require for a successful attack in practice.
4 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distinguisher
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test has been mentioned in [17] as a seemingly attractive alternative to MIA:
it is similarly able to generically compare the distributions of two samples but achieves this without explicit
estimation of their probability density functions (PDFs). It also extends fairly straightforwardly to bivariate dis-
tributions which makes it adaptable to second-order DPA attacks, although (unlike MI) it becomes problematic
in higher dimensions ([4]).
In this paper we are particularly interested in how KSA compares with MIA, in `typical' scenarios and in some
of the more speciﬁc scenarios for which MIA has been promoted, namely unknown power model and higher-
order attacks. The remainder of this section introduces the KS test and discusses its application to univariate
and bivariate (second-order) DPA attacks.
4.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Based DPA Attacks
The (two-sample) KS test statistic measures the distance between the empirical cumulative distribution func-
tions (CDFs) of two samples A = {Ai}ni=1 and B = {Bj}mj=1, in order to test whether they have been drawn
from the same distribution. It is deﬁned as supx∈A∪B |FA(x)− FB(x)| where FA, FB are the empirical CDFs,
i.e. FA(x) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 I{Ai≤x} (I{Ai≤x} is the indicator function, taking the value 1 if Ai ≤ x and 0 otherwise).
Just as MIA can be understood to operate by comparing the global traces T with the hypothesis-dependent con-
ditional traces T |Mkvia the expected change in entropya KS-inspired distinguisher measures the maximum
distance between the global and the conditional trace distributions, as averaged over the prediction space:
DKS(k) = E[K(T ||T |Mk)] = E
m∈M
[
sup
t
|FT (t)− FT |Mk=m(t)|
]
. (2)
In case of the correct key hypothesis we expect the test statistic to return a large diﬀerence.
The particular appeal of the KS statistic as an alternative to mutual information is that it does not require the
explicit estimation of densities, but only the calculation of empirical cumulative distribution functions.
Example: We illustrate the working principle of the KS test via a very simple example consisting of a DES
implementation leaking the Hamming weight (HW) of the ﬁrst S-Box with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR, deﬁned
as Var(L◦fk∗ (M))
Var(ε) ) of 8. For each key hypothesis we estimate the empirical CDFs of the traces as conditioned
on the model predictions and compare them with the `global' CDF of the traces by computing the expected
largest diﬀerence between them according to (2).
The left panel of Fig. 1 shows (in red) the conditional CDFs under the correct key hypothesis, where the `weight'
of the lines indicates the relative contribution of the prediction-speciﬁc KS statistics to the expectation which
comprises the KS distinguisher as in equation (2). The diﬀerenceand most pertinently the maximum (vertical)
distancebetween these conditional CDFs and the global CDF (in blue) is visibly substantial. By comparison
the right panel shows the same conditional CDFs as induced by an incorrect key hypothesis. These more closely
resemble the global CDF; it is clear to see that the expected maximum distance will be substantially smaller.
The same behaviour can be observed for all other incorrect key hypotheses, hence providing the rationale for
our KS-inspired distinguisher: we expect only the correct key hypothesis to produce a large average diﬀerence.
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Fig. 1: The KS test is based on the largest distance between the CDFs of two samples. The left and right panels show
the CDFs as conditioned on the model predictions under the correct key hypothesis and an incorrect key hypothesis,
respectively.
Note that, by design, the test is very sensitive to any distributional diﬀerence; this is one of the features which
makes it popular as a general, non-parametric method of comparison. But for the purposes of DPA there is
a potential downside to this sensitivity: the statistic will detect even the subtle diﬀerences induced by the
incorrect hypotheses, to the detriment of the margin by which the correct key is distinguished.
4.2 Multivariate Extensions
Standard ﬁrst-order DPA attacks apply a distinguisher to a single point in a trace. It is appealing to suppose
that including more than one data point might be beneﬁcial. In the case of attacks against unprotected imple-
mentations this could produce better results as more data points potentially imply that more information can
be exploited (this has been argued speciﬁcally for template attacks [3]). In the case of masked implementations
it could provide a way to defeat the masking scheme as the joint distributions of two or more trace points might
be related to unmasked model values.
Peacock ([12]) introduces a bivariate KS test statistic for comparing two-dimensional samples (A1,A2) =
{(A1,i, A2,i)}ni=1 and (B1,B2) = {(B1,j , B2,j)}mj=1, which he deﬁnes as:
sup
(x,y)∈(A1∪B1)×(A2∪B2)
|FA1,A2(x, y)− FB1,B2(x, y)|.
However, this extension is more problematic than the univariate case as it requires a meaningful construction
of bivariate empirical CDFs.
The distribution-free property of the KS test rests on being able to map any distribution function on to any other
distribution function using a transformation that preserves the ordering of the data. In the one-dimensional
case this is trivially fulﬁlled: there are only two ways of ordering data, namely P(A ≥ x) and P(A ≤ x). As we
have that P(A ≥ x) = 1− P(A ≤ x) the choice is in fact arbitrary.
In higher dimensions the empirical CDF can be deﬁned as:
FA1,A2(x, y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
IA1,i≤x,A2,j≤y
for all pairs (x, y). However, in the general case the choice of ordering now does aﬀect the test statistic: there
is no direct way to map (e.g.) between P(A1 ≤ x,A2 ≤ y) and P(A1 ≥ x,A2 ≤ y). In fact for d diﬀerent
random variables, there are 2d possible orderings we need to consider. The simplest solution to this problem, as
suggested by [12], is to ﬁnd the maximum distributional diﬀerence arising from all 2d possible orderings. The
computational complexity of this approach is exponential in the number of variables (O(2d∗nd)). Peacock shows
in his work that a bivariate KS test statistic according to his suggestion is close enough to being distribution-free
to be useful in practice.
Fasano and Franceschini [4] propose an optimisation whereby the test statistic is evaluated only at the points
which are observed in the sample, i.e. at every (x, y) ∈ (A1,A2) ∪ (B1,B2) rather than every (x, y) ∈ (A1 ∪
B1)× (A2 ∪B2). They are able to show that this leads to a linear increase in speed without compromising on
the power of the test or the distribution-free property.
We next explain how this bivariate extension of the test statistic can be adapted to DPA attacks in which two
trace points are exploited, and present analogous distinguishers based on multivariate extensions to mutual
information. Note that, whilst the latter has natural extensions to dimensions greater than 2, the KS statistic
is shown to be problematic in higher dimensions. The authors of ([4]) do present a three-dimensional test but
this is not achieved without some diﬃculty and a substantial increase in complexity (now 23 orderings need to
be considered); as such we choose not to make use of it ourselves.
Extensions for Masked Implementations In a second-order attack against a masked implementation we
make univariate leakage predictions based on the (unmasked) target value and then exploit what this `tells' us
about the joint distribution of the mask and the target value combined. For the KS distinguisher this means
that we are comparing the global joint CDF of the traces with the conditional joint CDFs as partitioned by the
model predictions under each key hypothesis:
D2OKS(k) = E[K(T1, T2||T1, T2|Mk)] = E
m∈M
[
sup
t1,t2
{|FT1,T2(t1, t2)− FT1,T2|Mk=m(t1, t2)|}] . (3)
Previous work (such as [2]) has explored the various ways in which mutual information generalises to higher
orders and how these diﬀerent notions can be adapted to the purposes of DPA. For the purposes of comparison
we focus on the extension which is most analogous to the KS distinguisher, namely the information shared
between the pair of trace points taken jointly and the model prediction, as follows:
D2OMI(k) = I((T1, T2);Mk) = H(T1, T2)−H(T1, T2|Mk). (4)
Extensions for Unprotected Implementations In an unprotected implementation we can use multivariate
extensions of our distinguishers to exploit the joint leakage of two target values simultaneously, for example key
addition and the output of the ﬁrst DES S-Box.1 This approach makes use of a bivariate model prediction and
thus calls for slightly diﬀerent constructions of the distinguishers to those employed in the context of masked
implementations.
For the KS distinguisher we simply condition the joint CDFs by the bivariate prediction and proceed as before:
DMKS(k) = E[K(T1, T2||T1, T2|(M1,M2)k)]
= E
(m1,m2)∈M1×M2
[
sup
t1,t2
{|FT1,T2(t1, t2)− FT1,T2|(M1,M2)k=(x1,x2)(t1, t2)|}] . (5)
Analogously we consider the MI between the pair of trace values and the pair of predictions:
DMMI(k) = I((T1, T2); (M1,M2)k) = H(T1, T2)−H(T1, T2|(M1,M2)k). (6)
5 Results
For each scenario that follows we ﬁrst analyse theoretic KSA and MIA vectors for varying levels of Gaussian
noise. These are derived from (respectively) true distributional diﬀerences and true entropies, computed directly
from the trace density functions as explained in Sect. 3. We complement this theoretic analysiswhich gives
an indication of the underlying potential of a distinguisherby estimating `practical' attack vectors against
simulated traces and reporting on trace requirements (again as noise varies).2
5.1 Optimistic Scenario: DES S-Box With (Known) Hamming Weight Leakage
We ﬁrst consider the simple and often-studied scenario in which the power consumption comprises a data-
dependent component proportional to the Hamming weight of the (ﬁrst) DES S-Box plus some independent
Gaussian noise. Assuming Hamming-weight leakage is realistic for implementations on simple micro-controllers
(e.g. [8] use this as their running example).
1 This choice is meaningful as the model predictions are in this case statistically independent.
2 For MIA estimations we employ the heuristic rule favoured by the literature, and estimate PDFs via histograms with
the number of bins equal to the cardinality of the power model image (i.e. 5 for the HW power model, 16 for the
identity power model). Therefore, though these are not `deﬁnitive' results (as no universally `best' estimator exists)
they do represent an established methodology and, as such, a meaningful basis for comparison with KSA.
Theoretic Outcomes
Pure-Signal Leakage: Figure 2 shows the theoretic distinguishing vectors for MIA and KSA attacks using a
Hamming weight (HW) power model against noise-free Hamming weight leakage of the ﬁrst DES S-Box. It
also illustrates our notion of distinguishability. Both distinguishers are capable of identifying the correct key;
MIA achieves a slightly higher distinguishability score of 5.6 compared with 4.2 for KSA. Equivalent attacks
using the identity (ID) power model were less distinguishing, with scores of 3.8 and 3.1 for MIA and KSA
respectively: evidently, the generic capabilities of the distinguishers are not useful in this `known power model'
scenario.
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Fig. 2: Theoretic distinguishing vectors for MIA(HW) and KSA(HW) in attacks against HW leakage of the ﬁrst DES
S-Box with zero noise.
As SNR Varies: Figure 3 shows how the distinguishability scores vary with the strength of the data-dependent
signal (relative to the Gaussian noise). The KSA attacks, though less distinguishing than their MIA counterparts
in strong-signal scenarios, are more robust to noise and therefore attain a theoretic advantage in weak-signal
scenarios.
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Fig. 3: Theoretic distinguishing power as SNR varies, for attacks against the ﬁrst DES S-Box with HW leakage.
Practical Outcomes (Simulations) The ﬁrst panel of Figure 4 shows the mean number of traces needed to
recover the key; the second panel shows the 90th-percentile, i.e. the number needed to achieve a 90% success
rate. KSA(HW) performs almost identically to MIA(HW) (as could be expected from the theoretic vectors),
with some evidence of a small advantage in weak-signal settings (again in keeping with the theoretic vectors).
The ID attacks are more data intensive in both cases, but KSA(ID) exhibits consistently better performance
than MIA(ID), probably due to the heavy estimation overhead incurred by the large number of bins required
by the latter.
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Fig. 4: Mean and 90th percentile of the trace requirement for key recovery, in repeated experiments against simulated
HW leakage of the ﬁrst DES S-Box, as SNR varies.
5.2 Realistic Scenario: DES S-Box With Unknown Power Model
We next consider the performance of the two distinguishers in the case that the attacker does not have a
precise power model. As motivated by [1] we focus on the case that the device leaksinstead of the Hamming
weightan unevenly weighted sum of the bits. This is realistic for typical micro-processors especially in the
low-cost range (as reported by [1]). In our experiments, we assume that the least signiﬁcant bit dominates in
the leakage function with a relative weight of 10; in the experiments of [17] this was suﬃcient distortion to
render MIA more eﬀective than correlation DPA. To extend this analysis we also consider theoretic vectors
assuming a highly non-linear power model3. This is relevant for hardware implementations, e.g. often non-linear
functions are implemented via combinational logic in hardware and it is well known (see [10], [15]) that such
implementations show leakage characteristics which are unrelated to linear leakage models.
Theoretic Outcomes
Pure-Signal Leakage: Both the HW and the generic ID variants of KSA are theoretically successful in a noise-
free environment, but once again are slightly disadvantaged relative to MIA with distinguishing scores of 2.8
and 3.4 compared with 4.8 and 4.8 respectively.
As SNR Varies: The impact of noise is more marked than that observed for the known power model scenario,
as can be seen in Figure 5; all attacks require a stronger signal before converging to their noise-free outcomes.
It is particularly notable that in high-noise settings the KSA attacks are actually more distinguishing than
their MIA counterparts. Also of interest is the fact that the ID variants exhibit stronger outcomes and greater
robustness to large amounts of noise than attacks using the (now imprecise) HW power model. Thus we conﬁrm
the existence of conditions under which KSA has the same `generic' potential as MIA.
3 To achieve a high-degree of non-linearity we use the Hamming weight of output of the AES SubBytes function.
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Fig. 5: Theoretic distinguishing power as SNR varies for attacks against the ﬁrst DES S-Box where the LSB dominates
in the leakage with a relative weight of 10 (left panel) and were the leakage is a highly non-linear function (right panel)
Practical Outcomes (Simulations) The theoretic KSA vectors show more distinguishing power than MIA
so we have suﬃcient reason to expect that this translates to a practical advantage in terms of trace requirements,
which we conﬁrmed by deriving the practical distinguishing vectors via simulations.
Figure 6 plots the results (w.r.t. number of traces needed) of the practical distinguishing vectors as estimated
from simulated traces with Gaussian noise. These tally well with the results of the theoretic vectors: ID attacks
substantially outperform HW attacks when the leakage signal is weak, but this advantage is less clear in high-
signal settings. KSA(ID) is particularly eﬀective relative to MIA(ID) as estimated with 16 bins (we note that
this does not necessarily represent the best-case capabilities of MIA but it is consistent with what one expects
given the theoretic distinguishing vectors). KSA(HW) performs similarly to MIA(HW).
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Fig. 6: Mean and 90th percentile of the trace requirement for key recovery, in repeated experiments against simulated
S-Box leakage in which the LSB dominates with a relative weight of 10.
5.3 Higher-Order Scenario: Second-Order Attacks Against a Masked Implementation
As our ﬁrst example of a multivariate application, we consider second-order attacks on a masked implementation
of DES leaking the HW of the mask and the HW of the S-Box output, each with independent Gaussian noise.
The second-order extensions for KSA and MIA distinguishers are as described in Sect.4.2.
Theoretic Outcomes
Pure-Signal Leakage: The noise-free distinguishing score of second-order KSA is just 0.6, compared with 3.2
for the MIA analogue. Thus both are capable of identifying the correct key, though with substantially reduced
distinguishability relative to their ﬁrst-order counterparts in unprotected scenarios, particularly in the case of
KSA, as Fig. 7 illustrates.
As SNR Varies: Mark once more in Figure 7 that the KSA variant of the second-order attack exhibits greater
noise robustness, so that in low-signal settings it shares comparable theoretic distinguishing power with MIA.
0.125 0.5 2 8 32 128
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Signal−to−noise ratio
N
ea
re
st
−r
iv
al
 d
ist
in
gu
ish
ab
ilit
y
 
 
MIA(HW)
KSA(HW)
2OMIA(HW)
2OKSA(HW)
Fig. 7: Theoretic distinguishing power as SNR varies, for second-order attacks against a masked implementation of DES
with HW leakage.
Practical Outcomes (Simulations) The ﬁrst panel of Figure 8 shows the success rates for attacks against
a masked DES implementation with noise-free leakage. The second-order KSA attack requires on average 150
traces, with a 90th-percentile of 325, whilst second-order MIA is markedly more eﬃcient, requiring on average
only 30 traces with a 90th-percentile of 45.
The remaining three panels show the same for scenarios in which small but increasing amounts of Gaussian noise
are added. Even with an SNR as high as 128 the impact on success is substantial for both attack methods but
(proportionately) more so for MIA. For an SNR of 32 (the lowest we attempted) the mean and 90th-percentile
of the trace requirement for KSA to be successful were 2,450 and 5,500 respectively; the equivalent ﬁgures for
MIA were 1,440 and 3,200.
The heavy computational demands of the second-order KSA distinguisher mean that, as more noise is added,
such attacks quickly become infeasible without enhanced computing power. Our theoretic analysis, and our
practical results in other scenarios, indicate that it could achieve a small advantage over MIA (in terms of data
complexity) when the signal is weak enough, but we are not able to test this and the advantage would likely
be far outweighed by the relative computational costs.
5.4 Bivariate Extensions for an Unprotected Implementation
We next investigate whether or not attack outcomes can be improved by the incorporation of a second trace
measurement corresponding to a diﬀerent target function. In particular, we consider exploiting the joint leakage
of key addition and the ﬁrst DES S-Box, in the case that this is comprised of the Hamming weight of the target
values plus some independent Gaussian noise.
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Fig. 8: Success rates of attacks against a masked implementation of DES with HW leakage, as the number of traces
increases.
Pure-Signal Leakage: The noise-free distinguishability scores of bivariate MIA and KSA attacks are 3.6 and 1.7
respectively, compared with 5.6 and 4.2 for the equivalent univariate S-Box attacks. Thus, both methods are
actually weakened by the incorporation of key addition leakage; KSA more so than MIA.
However, it is well documented that the resistance of a function to DPA has an inverse relationship with its
resistance to cryptanalysis ([13]). In particular, the linearity of key addition makes it hard for DPA to distinguish
between similar keys: small changes to the input produce small changes in the output. S-Boxes, on the other
hand, are specially designed so that the converse is true, which makes them particularly vulnerable to DPA.
It is not, then, so surprising that key addition information detracts from attack distinguishability. If the leakage
of two suitably nonlinear functions could be jointly targeted, our bivariate enhancement may prove more
usefulwe leave this as an open question.
As SNR Varies: Figure 9 shows the distinguishing scores of the bivariate attacks as compared with the uni-
variate S-Box attacks, for varying levels of Gaussian noise. As with the univariate attacks, the bivariate KSA
distinguisher is more robust to noise so that in very low-signal settings it exhibits a slight advantage over the
bivariate (and indeed the univariate) MIA distinguisher. As in the application to the masked implementation,
for all noise levels (i.e. including the noise-free setting) the bivariate distinguishing vectors are considerably less
distinguishing than their univariate counterparts.
Practical Outcomes (Simulations) Figure 10 depicts the performance of practical bivariate attacks (against
the DES S-Box and key addition jointly) as compared with univariate attacks against the DES S-Box alone.
The lower theoretical distinguishing power, coupled with the additional complexity of estimation, mean that
the bivariate attacks require more traces to be successful, in all tested noise settings. As with the univariate
attacks, bivariate KSA performs very similarly to bivariate MIA.
These results (w.r.t. both theoretic and practical distinguishing vectors) are an important reminder that it is not
the quantity of information which contributes to attack outcomes so much as the quality : identifying the most
vulnerable targets is more likely to be fruitful than combining information from targets with diﬀering degrees
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Fig. 9: Theoretic distinguishing power as SNR varies, for bivariate attacks against DES with HW leakage.
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Fig. 10: Mean and 90th percentile of the trace requirement for key recovery, in repeated experiments against simulated
HW leakage of AddRoundKey and the ﬁrst DES S-Box jointly, as SNR varies.
of DPA resistance. Moreover, univariate attacks remain less demanding in terms of computational complexity
and the sample size required for estimation.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the (two-sample) KS test statistic can be adapted to the purposes of DPA in a manner
which bears considerable resemblance to MI-based DPA. We explored the theoretic and practical distinguishing
vectors of KSA as compared with MIA, with a particular focus on scenarios that are relevant for practice.
Our ﬁndings showed that in noise-free or strong-signal univariate settings MIA was consistently the more
distinguishing and more eﬃcient attack, but when the signal was suﬃciently weak the noise-robustness of KSA
enabled it to gain an advantage.
The KSA distinguisher was found to share those characteristics of MIA which make it to some extent `power
model free'; each can be adapted to use the identity power model in the case that an attacker lacks precise
knowledge of the true data-dependent leakage (provided the target function is non-injective).
We also showed how a bivariate version of the (two-sample) KS test statistic enables extension to second-order
KSA in order to defeat a masking scheme. However, here it was quite substantially outperformed by MIA in
strong-signal settings and was so computationally complex as to be unfeasible in weak-signal settings. Moreover,
whereas multivariate MI quite naturally incorporates additional data points, extensions of the KS test beyond
2 dimensions quickly become problematic so that there is little scope for third- or higher-order KSA.
A interesting question for future work is whether or not the known distribution of the KS test statistic could be
used to formally derive the number of traces required for an attack to be successful, as has been accomplished
in the case of correlation DPA (see 6.4 of [8]). Whilst the distribution of the KS test statistic is known it is
unclear how it could be used to derive that of the KSA distinguisher (recall that this is deﬁned as an average
over several KS test statistics).
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